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INTRODUCTION
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS
TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE
Dino Kritsiotis*
Territory is not only the denotation of a certain physical or geo-
graphical space: it also happens to be a state of mind-a given way of
thinking. We know this when we come to public international law be-
cause the concept of territory abounds in a multitude of its
provisions-whether it be in terms of one of the qualifications for
Statehood under the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States,' or on the cartographization of sovereign jurisdiction,2
or as one of the conditions for the application of certain obligations to
non-State actors involved in non-international armed conflicts Territory,
or the concept of territory, thus asserts itself throughout the discipline of
public international law, and its influences can be felt either through di-
rect means or discrete. It has informed the modes for the acquisition of
sovereignty, essential to the concept of "territorial sovereignty";4 it is a
fundamental component in how we distinguish refugees from internally
* Reader in Public International Law, University of Nottingham; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 49 Stat. 3097 (1933).
2. As Article 9 of the Montevideo Convention provides, "[t]he jurisdiction of [S]tates
within the limits of national territory applies to all the inhabitants." Id. art. 9; see also DAVID
BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 20
(2006); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005).
3. This also occurs in the Second Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. According to Article 1 (1) of the Protocol, whose provisions
become applicable to those non-internaional armed conflicts "which take place in the territory
of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and
to implement this Protocol." Id. at pmbl. (emphasis added). Although the Protocol "develops
and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949" (id. art.
1.), this stipulation serves to filter those non-international armed conflicts to which the Proto-
col becomes applicable. It does so alongside its criterion concerning "responsible command"
and its reference to the armed forces of the relevant High Contracting Party, considerations
which are not mentioned for the activation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of
August 1949-which applies "[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." See Rosemary Abi-Saab,
Humanitarian Law and Internal Conflicts: The Evolution of Legal Concern, in HUMANITAR-
IAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 209, 215 (1991) (Astrid J.M. Delissen &
Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991) (emphasis added).
4. J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 162 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); see also VAUGHAN LOWE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 140-44 (2007).
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displaced persons;5 and the General Assembly's Declaration on Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States of October 1970 makes clear that "nothing" in
its terms
shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territo-
rial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... and thus
possessed of a government representing the whole people be-
longing to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
color.6
These are all manifestations of what we might call the territorial impera-
tive of public international law.7
There is perhaps no greater sense of territorial thinking on the legal
imagination than in the development of the high fiction of the "territorial
sea" 8 so-called because of its connotations to sovereignty-or to the
5. Compare Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. IA(2), July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137, amended by Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(1), Jan. 31,
1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (defining "refugee" as a person who, "owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it") (emphases added) with Forced Migration Online,
http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo041/ (last visited June 15, 2009) (defining "inter-
nally displaced persons" as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to
flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of
human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internally
recognized State border") (emphasis added).
6. G.A. Res. 2625, at 121, 124, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 (Oct. 24, 1970)
(emphases added). Note, too, that in announcing its Declaration on the Granting of Independ-
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Dec. 1960, the General Assembly declared that
"[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations." G.A. Res. 1514, at 67, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/4684A (Dec. 14, 1960).
7. DAVID J. ELKINs, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: TERRITORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13-39 (1995); see also, Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial
Imperative: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 830 (2006).
8. The same can be said of its earlier formulation of "territorial waters". See Percy
Thomas Fenn, Jr., Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 465, 478
(1926). The consolidation of the notion of the territorial sea was intimately connected with the
"birth of territoriality" that succeeded the Holy Roman Empire. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V.
LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 71 (3d ed. 1999).
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rights of the territorial sovereign.9 It is a most revealing choice of
language that continues through to our time, and it betrays the commit-
ment of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to
the "legal basis" of the five Geneva Conventions of April 1958, as
"epitomized by the key words sovereignty (internal and territorial wa-
ters), control, sovereign rights, freedoms" but where "important changes
have taken place within those structures."' According to the 1982 Con-
vention, "[t]he sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land
territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its
archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial
sea."" This sovereignty further applies to the air space over the territorial
sea, as it does to its bed and subsoil,' 2 but it must be exercised "subject to
this Convention and to other rules of international law."'3 It is an ar-
rangement that marks the culmination of various normative affiliations
'4that coastal States have had with their adjoining oceans over time, so
9. See BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 162. For an important assessment of the intellectual
underpinnings of the concept, however, see Daniel P. O'Connell, The Juridical Nature of the
Territorial Sea, 1971 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 303.
10. Philip Allott, Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 (1983).
These Geneva Conventions, known collectively as the "Geneva five," include the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; the Convention
on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11; the Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; and the Optional Pro-
tocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes Arising from the Law
of the Sea Conventions, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169; see also Oxman, supra note 7, at
835.
11. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 2(1), Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter 1982 United Nations Convention].
12. Id. art. 2(2).
13. Id. art. 2(3). The most significant of these other rules is the "right of innocent pas-
sage" a term defined in Articles 18 and 19. See id. art. 17 ("Subject to this Convention, ships
of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea"). Note, however, the ideas and the language that are used to construct the con-
cepts of the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf in the
Convention: there are shades or semblances of sovereignty here, of what it is to be sovereign.
In the contiguous zone, the coast State "may exercise the control necessary" to prevent in-
fringements of its custom, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within its
territory or territorial sea and to punish infringement of these aforementioned laws. See id. art.
33. For the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State is awarded "sovereign rights" for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving, and managing the natural resources, and
jurisdiction with respect to (i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and
structures; (ii) marine scientific research, and (iii) the protection and preservation of the ma-
rine environment. Id. Art. 56. And, as far as the continental shelf is concerned, the coastal
State "exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploring its natural resources"-rights which are "exclusive," according to the Convention,
"in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natu-
ral resources, no one may undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal
State." Id. art. 77 (emphasis added). On this point, see also Oxman, supra note 7, at 836.
14. See O'Connell, supra note 9.
Spring 2009]
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that British and American jurisdictional claims of the early nineteenth
century need to be set against the sovereign claims made in the civil
codes of several Latin American countries, and, further still, ought to be
differentiated from the qualified jurisdictional competences claimed by
States such as France and Spain (in respect of defense and the regulation
of customs and fishing).
5
The oceans, then, have become an important platform for the projec-
tion of territorial thinking: it has been said that "[tihe territorial
temptation thrust seaward with a speed and geographic scope that would
be the envy of the most ambitious conquerors in human history."'6 We
see the same sort of reasoning applied to the legal status of air space fol-
lowing the First World War,7 though we can observe crucial occasions
when public international law has been informed by other considera-
tions: "[o]uter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means,"'" and, as far as the high
seas are concerned, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea instructs that "[n]o State may validly purport to subject any part
of the high seas to its sovereignty."' 9 The Convention also provides for
the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, together with its re-
sources, as the common heritage of mankind,2° not subject to the
15. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 8, at 74 (remarking that "[w]ith hindsight it is
possible to see that the trend in doctrine and State practice was steadily towards recognition of
coastal States' sovereignty over their territorial seas."); see also John A. Duff, Assemblage-
Oriented Ocean Resource Management: How the Marine Environment Washes over Tradi-
tional Territorial Lines, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 643, 646 (2009).
16. Oxman, supra note 7, at 832 (pinning "[t]he effective start of this process" to the
Truman Proclamation concerning the continental shelf of Sept. 28, 1945, and citing Presiden-
tial Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources
of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf. This was codified as 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305
(1945)). See further, The Scramble for the Seabed: Suddenly, A Wider World Below the Water-
line, ECONOMIST, May 16, 2009, at 29. See also, 1982 United Nations Convention, supra note
11, art. 2(2) (provision made for the air space above the territorial sea).
17. See Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 174; BRIERLY, supra note 4, at 218. The Convention on International Civil Aviation
art. 1, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 confirms that "[t]he Contracting States
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its
territory." By virtue of Article 2 of the Convention, the territory of a State is defined as "the
land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection
or mandate of such State." Id. art. 2. For further assessment, see STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS
THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON (2008).
18. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 2, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
19. 1982 United Nations Convention, supra note 11, art. 89.
20. Id. art. 136. On the evolution of this concept, see ARvlD PARDO, THE COMMON
HERITAGE: SELECTED PAPERS ON OCEANS AND WORLD ORDER 1967-74 (1975).
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sovereignty or to the sovereign rights of any State." These are important
formulations for public international law to have made, and can be use-
fully contrasted with the position it has taken on Antarctica, where
[n]o acts or activities taking place while the present treaty is in
force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying
a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty shall
be asserted while the present treaty is in force.22
No identical arrangement is in place for the Arctic,23 where we have
observed an escalation in State interest and activity (not to mention dip-
lomatic tensions) of late.U
The essays that have been convened for this Symposium, held in
Ann Arbor on February 6 and 7, 2009, demonstrate the ebbs and flows of
the territorial imperative within public international law, which are re-
flected in the very title chosen for the deliberations of those days, that of
"Territory Without Boundaries."
25
21. 1982 United Nations Convention, supra note 11, art. 137.
22. The Antarctica Treaty art. IV(2), Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 71. It is
the "freezing" of territorial claims-rather than the outlawry of them altogether-that has
been heralded as the treaty's chief success. See D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 233 (6th ed. 2004).
23. See HARRIS, supra note 22, at 234-35. But see LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1570 (4th ed. 2001). The provisions of the 1982
United Nations Convention are, however, applicable-i.e., in respect of the continental shelf.
See Hans Correll, Reflections on the Possibilities and Limitations of a Binding Legal Regime
for the Arctic, 37 ENV. POL'Y & L. 321 (1997).
24. The Great Arctic Oil Rush, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at 9 (describing the Russian
Federation's planting of its national flag on the seabed two miles under the polar ice cap-
behavior which Peter McKay, the Canadian Foreign Minister, has described as redolent of the
fifteenth century); see also MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 534-36 (6th ed. 2008);
Alok Jha, Frozen Assets: How New Survey of Arctic's Riches Could Stoke International Strife,
GUARDIAN, May 29, 2009, at 9.
The "sector principle" associated with the Arctic does provide a classic instance of terri-
torial thinking, since "land territory facing the Arctic is argued to afford a basis for claiming
sovereignty over all territory lying to the north and within a sector bounded by the eastward
and westward meridians of longitude at either end of the land territory and extending north-
ward until they meet at the Pole." 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 693 (Sir Robert
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). The principle therefore takes as its premise
that we are dealing with territory-possibly "territorial ice"?-when, in fact, the Arctic com-
prises "frozen sea" where "the ice shifts with the currents." Id. at 692; see also Juliette Jowit,
Thinner than We Thought: Alarm at Arctic Ice Study, GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 2009, at 13. This
matter is briefly addressed in the article of Ted L. McDorman: Canada-United States Coop-
erative Approaches to Shared Marine Fishery Resources: Territorial Subversion?, 30 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 665, 670-71 (2009).
25. An important contribution to those deliberations, although not published here, is
that of Vasuki Nesiah (Brown University), Slumdog Million Reforms: Bollywood Fantasies
Spring 2009]
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The collection resulting from the Symposium has been prepared for
publication and is presented in four sections. It commences, however,
with the keynote address of Saskia Sassen, of Columbia University, New
York and the London School of Economics and Political Science. Sassen
is ideal for this task. Her Essay identifies how "[t]he globalization of a
broad range of processes shows us that borders can extend deep into na-
tional territory, they are constituted through many more institutions than
simply the nation State, and they have many more locations than is sug-
and the Global City, at 2 (on file with author and with the Michigan Journal of International
Law) (considering in a persuasive and refreshing light how global cities "simultaneously oc-
cupy different, contradictory spaces in the global economic system"). So "U]ust as these cities
are marked with new opportunities and rewards, they also have their exclusions and hierar-
chies; they are strategic nodal points of finance and technology on one accounting, but also
below the radar flows of illicit commodities and marginal communities on the other." Id. at 3;
see also Saskia Sassen, The Urban Map of Terror, GUARDIAN, May 28, 2009, at 32. Note how
the concept of territory, and of territory as metaphor, have informed other aspects of Nesiah's
scholarship: see, e.g., From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice, 17 HARV.
Hum. RTS. J. 75 (2004) (examining "how legitimacy is sought in contemporary approaches to
international engagement through proposed legal and normative discussions between military
offensives and humanitarian intervention"); Vasuki Nesiah, Placing International Law: White
Spaces on a Map, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1 (2003) (looking "at the paradoxes attending the
endurance of the statist framework in conceptualizing territorial self-determination as well as
in curtailing it").
The concept of the global city derives from Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing
a Concept, 11 BROWN J. WORLD An'., Winter/Summer 2005 at 27 (2005); see also SASKIA
SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (2nd ed. 2001). Nesiah adopts a
looser appreciation of this concept for her paper, however. With its welcome focus on cities
from the global South-in particular Mumbai and Bangalore-a critical perspective is brought
to bear on proposals for reforming the governance and the well-being of these cities. "Much of
the regulatory apparatus that governs [the] lives [of the urban poor] are in fact the effects of
transnational processes and supranational institutions." See Nesiah, Slumdog Million Reforms,
at 8. Nesiah also notes that
[u]ndoubtedly there is a democracy deficit ... when suicides and violence are the
primary expressions of political protest but it is difficult to see how this deficit is
addressed by a more participatory local government structure. There is a gulf be-
tween the vision of democratization that is informing the urban policy reform
project and the technologies of governance that obtain in globalized urban spaces.
Clearly, democratization and participation cannot translate into redistribution.
Id. at 9-10. These reforms of urban planners, sociologists, and economists do not have a firm
handle on the "contradictory spaces" of the global cities examined, on the urban landscape
upon which they are seeking to make their mark. And it is maldistribution-one can argue
endemic maldistribution-which establishes the need for reform: "From class to gender, relig-
ion to caste, maldistribution is the defining mark of access to information, judicial services,
health services, education and transportation" Nesiah, Slumdog Million Reforms, at 3. We might
take this as a point of difference in examining how other cities (and towns) affect our understand-
ing of border relations and of the spatial dynamics of a State. See, e.g., Dan Bilesky, Slovenia
Border Spat Imperils Croatia's NATO Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at A8; Eamon Quinn, A
Northern Ireland Town Is a Shoppers'Paradise, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 18,2008, at A14.
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gested by standard geographic representations ' 26 to the point where
foundational changes are occurring within the international system:
we are now seeing the incipient formation of new bordering ca-
pabilities and of new state practices regarding territory. These
entail the partial denationalizing of what historically has been
constructed as national, a process that unsettles the meaning of
geographic borders. Critical to this argument is the proposition
that global processes also take place at subnational levels,
thereby disrupting the notion of mutual exclusivity between the
national and the global.27
We are therefore transported beyond concepts and analogies of "state
territorial authority"28 toward "subnational constitution of global proc-
esses" and "the partial unbundling of traditional national territorial
borders and the formation of new bordering capabilities, both subna-
tional and transnational. ' 29 The purpose here is to gain a deeper
awareness of "the proliferation of subnational scalings of global proc-
esses and institutions,"3° both in their variety as well as their formidable
complexity, in our bid to understand better the changing configurations
of State and institutional techniques of power and control. To this end,
we can no longer treat borders as "geographic events" Sassen argues,31
but must award them their descriptive and normative due-a process that
might require more relevant methodologies (i.e. "categories for analy-
sis"),2 and perhaps even innovative vocabularies to allow us to come to
terms with "the specificities of the current changes. 33
26. Saskia Sassen, Bordering Capabilities Versus Borders: Implications for National
Borders, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 567, 575 (2009). Professor Sassen's essay is based on an article
that first appeared in NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY. See Saskia Sassen, When National Territory
Is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel Borderings, 10 NEW POL. ECON. 523 (2005).
27. Id. at 573.
28. Id. at 573 ("When we conceive of globalization as enacted at subnational scales and
institutional domains, we can posit the proliferation of borderings within national territories.").
29. Id. at 571.
30. Id. at 573. This is the subject of the collection of essays edited by Sassen: DECI-
PHERING THE GLOBAL: ITS SCALES, SPACES AND SUBJECTS (Saskia Sassen ed., 2007).
31. Id. at 574.
32. Id. at 574.
33. Id. at 576. Sassen argues that "the mix of processes we describe as globalization is
indeed producing an incomplete yet significant form of authority deep within the national
State, that is, a hybrid authority that is neither fully private nor fully public, neither fully na-
tional nor fully global." Id. at 579. Sassen writes at another point that the "critical conceptual
task" of "the need to decode particular aspects of what is still represented or experienced as
'national,' which may, in fact, have shifted from its historical conception." Id. at 584; see also
id. at 578. Indeed, this forms a general theme of John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Be-
yond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139 (1993).
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The first of the four sections of the Symposium concerns the "colo-
nization of natural resources, '3 where Eric A. Bilsky of Oceana draws
our attention to the limitations of archetypal techniques of law enforce-
ment-of territorial law enforcement, that is-as applied to the
conservation of marine wildlife. In his carefully worked Essay, we are
made aware of how and why this is so, of (among other things) the in-
dustrial revolution that has occurred upon the oceans,3" its consequences,
and of the measures that might be developed to stall the trend of the de-
pletion of these resources. According to Bilsky, "[t]he crucial questions
for advocates of an agreement to reduce overfishing subsidies include (1)
whether the WTO negotiating system is up to the task of creating another
package deal, or 'single undertaking,' reflecting a major new interna-
tional trade agreement and, if so, (2) whether the political will exists to
include effective and new disciplines on fisheries subsidies. 36
There is a keen sense here of the significance of international institu-
tions in stemming the colonization of resources,37 and of the dangers that
will result if States are left (as so often they are) to their own vices. From
another angle, this could be read as an argument for a more coherent and
less fragmented system of public international law-the pursuit, one
could say, of unified ambitions and purpose for the discipline.
John Duff (University of Massachusetts) picks up on some of these
themes in his contribution to this Issue, arguing that marine resource de-
velopment "has often been affected less by territorial considerations than
by the initiative of people and the actions of lawmakers."38 We are given
a good flavor of the sorts of circumstances where this came to pass, such
as the Guano Islands Act of August 1856, in which the United States
Congress provided that
[w]henever any citizen of the United States discovers a deposit
of guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful juris-
diction of any other government, and not occupied by the
34. This was addressed in a recent survey in THE ECONOMIST, where, as the result of its
quest for natural resources in Africa, China was described as being among "The New Colo-
nists" of the world, with important consequences for the relationship of certain States-
Angola and the Sudan are mentioned-with the International Monetary Fund. See A Ravenous
Dragon, ECONOMIST (London), Mar. 15, 2008, at 3-4.
35. Eric A. Bilsky, Conserving Marine Wildlife Through World Trade Law, 30 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 599, 605 (2009); see also Duff, supra note 15, at 648.
36. Bilsky, supra note 35, at 622.
37. This is also the approach of the 1982 United Nations Convention, supra note 11, pt.
XI (establishing an International Sea Bed Authority with respect to the Area). But see CHUR-
CHILL & LOWE, supra note 8, at 239. For a general critique of our commitment to
international institutions, however, see B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Im-
perial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
38. Duff, supra note 15, at 654.
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citizens of any other government, and takes peaceful possession
thereof, and occupies the same, such island, rock, or key may, at
the discretion of the President [of the United States], be consid-
ered as appertaining to the United States.39
Duff invites us to consider this legislation as an assemblage, ° "tai-
lored to address the national governance and private utilization desires of
state and commercial actors."' It is precisely this theme that is seized
and developed to persuasive effect by Ted L. McDorman (University of
Victoria) in his Essay, "Canada-United States Cooperative Approaches
to Shared Marine Fisheries Resources: Territorial Subversion?," 2 which
usefully explores both the promise and the shortcomings of bilateral
cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect to cross-
border marine living resources. The failed initiatives that have occurred
within this relationship "indicate the authority of territorialism and prop-
erty in shaping attitudes and inhibiting compromise that departs from a
rigid application of territorialism,' 43 although McDorman does well to
remind us that these experiences do not form the essence of the relation-
ship between Canada and the United States: that, he maintains, is defined
by a series of cooperative successes." And, to be sure, "territorialism"
39. 48 U.S.C. § 1411 (1856) (emphasis added); see also Christina Duffy Burnett, The
Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American Guano Islands, 57 AM. Q. 779
(2005).
40. Pace the title of Duff's contribution, supra note 15, as well as SASKIA SASSEN, TER-
RITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006). Duff
addresses a concept that "focuses on how territory, authority, and rights have been aggregated
to form the foundations of nation-states during the Late Middle Ages and how they are often
assembled in our present era to serve as the foundation for global systems." Duff, supra note
11, at 660-61. However, as Duff writes, "the term is also used in a narrower sense by ecolo-
gists and natural resources managers to describe some group of biological organisms and/or
physical habitat structures that occupy the same space and time such that they ought to be
considered and managed with an understanding of those relationships and simultaneities."
Duff, supra note 15, at 661.
41. Duff, supra note 15, at 661.
42. McDorman, supra note 24, at 665.
43. Id. at 672. This had the consequence of hurting the very thing the 1979 East Coast
Fishery Agreement and the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty were designed to assist, fish stocks.
44. Id. at 677. This idea was also acknowledged by no less than the International Court
of Justice:
Canada and the United States have to their credit too long a tradition of friendly and
fruitful co-operation in maritime matters, as in so many other domains, for there to
be any need to fear an interruption of that co-operation, which clearly now becomes
all the more necessary, not only in the field of fisheries but also in that of hydrocar-
bon resources.
Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246,
§ 240 (Oct. 12); see also, McDorman, supra note 24, at 686.
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has had its fair share in shaping the outlook and strategic thinking of
both of these countries.45
We then move to the second section of the Symposium, on the con-
cept of "urban territory" in a global world, where Hai M. Osofsky of
Washington and Lee University Law School opens up the idea of legal
spaces in her consideration of "the territory of San Bernardino County,"
California,' which is "certainly 'local' from a formal legal perspective,
but its physical and spatial characteristics resemble those of a much lar-
ger entity.' 47 Osofsky argues for a law and geography approach in
registering the "layered interactions" that affect the county with respect
to the question of climate change,48 and the results make us take a step
back and consider which epistemic units ground not only our interpreta-
tions but also our legal solutions-in other words, which structures
govern our thinking. Her contribution offers important insights on a
much-neglected "window into the complexities of defining a local scale
in an interconnected world,"49 which will, in turn, bring us much closer
(and helpfully so) into contact with the "common threads of micro-
interactions and multiscalar networks which ... shed light on the scale
of the 'local.' ,50
45. As in Article I of the 1990 Canada-United States Fisheries Enforcement Agree-
ment, which provides that
[e]ach Party shall take appropriate measures consistent with international law to en-
sure that its nationals, residents and vessels do not violate, within the waters and
zones of the other Party, the national fisheries laws and regulations of the other
Party. Such measures shall include prohibitions on violating the fisheries laws and
regulations of the other Party respecting gear stowage, fishing without authoriza-
tion, and interfering with, resisting, or obstructing in any manner, efforts to enforce
such laws and regulations; and may include such other prohibitions as each Party
deems appropriate.
Fisheries Enforcement Agreement, at 38-39, Can-U.S., Sept. 26, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 419. For
McDorman, "[tihis obligation simultaneously respects territorialism (a State can only directly
enforce within its territory) and undermines territorialism (by ensuring that a fisher of one
State will be prosecuted and punished for illegal activity in the other State)." McDorman,
supra note 24, at 684. It is interesting that in his discussion of the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty,
McDorman does not view "the State-of-origin" concept as territorial in character, but as a
"quasi-property right" that prevailed in Canada, against "the territorialist approach of the
salmon being present in Alaskan waters"-the prevalent view in the United States. Id. at 676.
46. Hari M. Osofsky, Scaling "Local": The Implications of Greenhouse Gas Regulation
in San Bernardino County, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 689, 690 (2009).
47. Id. at 690-91 (observing that San Bernardino County is "almost twice the size of
Israel"); see also Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L.
REV. 843 (1999).
48. Osofsky, supra note 46, at 691-92.
49. Id. at 691; see also DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS Is GLOBAL: EXPLAINING
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES (2007).
50. Osofsky, supra note 46, at 705.
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Very much in the spirit of this approach, Lisa R. Pruitt, of University
of California (Davis) School of Law, asks us to rethink our concentration
on urban spaces and to think more in terms of the "rural-urban axis";"
hers is a clarion call to challenge "an implicit urban norm. 52 This norm,
it is true, might provide useful counterpoints to statist dispensations and
forms of analysis, but it is clear from Pruitt's fine and cogent piece that
refocusing our attentions upon urban spaces might itself be deserving of
its own critique:
Perhaps it is contrarian to talk about rural people and places
when invited to participate in a panel entitled "Urban Territory
in a Global World," which is part of a [Slymposium titled "Terri-
tory Without Boundaries." But surely a panel with a title using
the word "urban" invites-at least implicitly-a discussion of
the rural "other." Indeed, a necessary complement to thinking
about and studying global cities is thinking about and studying
the global countryside. I use the term "global countryside" de-
liberately, to refute rurality's long-standing association with the
local, because our global economy is bringing country dwellers
to the city and sometimes, more recently, sending them back.53
The shift to the global countryside alerts us to the real as well as
potential gender implications of globalization-its direct impact, for
example, on rural women as agricultural producers, but also the indirect
consequences of high levels of debt incurred by developing countries.
"[R]ising debt," writes Pruitt, "severely limits [S]tate spending on
education, health care, and other services," such that "[w]omen and
children, often beneficiaries of such spending, frequently bear the brunt
of debt's consequences. 54 Even so, the essay then commits itself to
explaining how migratory patterns from the global countryside might
hold out some potential for increasing "women's agency and decision-
making power,"55 all told through the prism of the 1979 Convention
Against the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
51. Lisa R. Pruitt, Migration, Development, and the Promise of CEDAW for Rural
Women, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 707, 749 (2009); id. at 731 (discussing the "rural-urban differ-
ence").
52. Id. at 757.
53. Id. at 709 (footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 715. This rising debt leads to what Pruitt calls the 'economic vulnerability' of
rural women. Id. at 721. Note, however, the disparities in governmental expenditure that do
not account for, or correspond to, rural demographics. Id. at 725.
55. Id. at 721.
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Women. 6 This Convention, we learn, "seeks to confer agency on rural
women in ways that have material consequences,"" as its:
framework... proposes getting resources into the hands of rural
women right where they are. This, in turn, implicates not only
local officials but also the stances and priorities of rural devel-
opment organizations. Such development agencies might
constructively and strategically make material assistance contin-
gent on the inclusion of women "at all levels" and stages of
development planning. Alternatively, these organizations could
monitor the ways in which recipients facilitate women's access
to the types of resources for which [the Convention] recognizes
their need.5
Then, in the third section of the Symposium which is devoted to
"Immigration Beyond Territory," my colleague Alice Edwards of the
University of Nottingham addresses the concept of human security. In an
invigorating tour d'horizon of the subject, she explains how certain intel-
lectual energies have shifted focus from sovereign security to human
security-or, better, how sovereign security can be achieved through
human security. A critical element emerges, though, on the relationship
of human security to the existing canon of human rights within public
international law, and Edwards navigates what the complexities of this
relationship entail for refugees-a vital aspect of her overall argument
and synthesis. 9 Recognizing the "reasonably robust, albeit imperfect"
provisions of public international law,6° she launches a cautious but cru-
cial appeal for serious consideration of the concept of human security
and for interdisciplinary thinking:
Human security, as a fluid and broad ranging concept compati-
ble with human rights and supplementary to international law,
may be one means through which the rights, dignity, and secu-
rity of refugees can be furthered. Human security speaks to state
interests, while reinforcing human rights objectives. Law is the
56. G.A. Res. 34/180, at 193, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc.
A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).
57. Pruitt, supra note 51, at 749. This is because the rights itemized in Art. 14 of the
Convention are "not of the standard civil rights variety (for example, freedom of speech)." Id.
58. Id. at 755 (footnotes omitted).
59. See Alice Edwards, Human Security and the Rights of Refugees: Transcending
Territorial and Disciplinary Borders, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 763 (2009).
60. Id. at 791. Though Edwards concludes that international human rights law does
"strengthen and enhance existing protection standards for refugees," id. at 795, she remarks
how it "has increasingly become an important supplement to refugee protection," id. at 797;




safety net for refugees, which needs to be strengthened by, in
particular, improved access to judicial redress mechanisms.
However, law is only one instrument in the toolbox of interna-
tional relations. Human security, in contrast, offers added
benefits in terms of its flexibility, conceptual appeal, and loca-
tion in the political corridors of the mainstream United Nations.6
This Essay is followed by that of Ayelet Shachar from the Faculty of
Law in the University of Toronto, who meticulously traces the "shifting
border" of immigration regulation-and assesses how, through this sub-
tle mechanism, the State has furnished itself with an even greater set of
powers.62 "[T]he location of the border is shifting," Shachar writes, "at
times penetrating into the interior, in other circumstances extending be-
yond the edge of the territory, 63 so that, in the United States for
example, the authority of the State can now be asserted after migrants
have entered its territory,6 and where expedited removals can be "im-
plemented not only in the interior but also extended beyond the external
perimeter of the U.S. borderline."6 A further development-and con-
cern-in her analysis is how the United States has made its presence felt
outside its territorial parameters, from the collation of biometric infor-
mation which:
can take place outside the United States-in foreign territories-
sometimes located tens, hundreds, or even thousands of miles
away from the country's actual territorial borders, in places such
as Ireland's Dublin or Shannon international airports, Canada's
Toronto and Montreal international airports, or Bermuda and Ba-
hamas' international airports. None of these spaces can plausibly
61. Id. at 806.
62. Ayelet Shachar, The Shifting Border of Immigrant Regulation, 3 STANFORD J.C.R.
& C.L. 165 (2007) reprinted in 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 809 (2009). For a similar analysis, see
also Sassen, supra note 26, at 572. For further on this particular theme, see States Without
Nations: Research and Commentary on State Efforts to Restrict the Movement of People
Across Borders, and on the Alternatives, www.stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com (last visited
June 17, 2009).
63. See Shachar, supra note 62, at 810 (emphasis in original).
64. This authority can be asserted in accordance with Section 212 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (leading Shachar to conclude that "the exclusion-
deportation line has become de-territorialized: the key factor for the legal analysis is not
whether the person has passed through the territory's frontiers (where the border traditionally
resided). Rather the only question that matters for immigration regulation purposes is whether
the person has crossed at any time or place through law's gates of admission, which, as the
[Act] proclaims without hesitation, are not territorially fixed but rather 'designated by the
Attorney General'" (footnote omitted)). Shachar, supra note 62, at 816.
65. Id. at 814. Shachar also remarks that expedited removal, "a procedure typically
exercised at the 'edge' of territory ... could apply with equal force to individuals who have
already been present within the country for a period of up to two years." Id. at 817.
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be construed to lie within U.S. territory, yet American immigra-
tion officials conduct their business there as a matter of course.
6
67From the shifting border of immigration regulation, we turn to the
contribution of Adam Weiss of the Aire Center in London, on domestic
violence in the context of transnational families in Europe.68 We might
consider this an assessment of the legal protection afforded to members
of such families, or the shortcomings thereof, for in his critique of Euro-
pean Community Directive 2004/38,69Weiss comes to the conclusion
that the law "superficially gives the impression of protection, but in prac-
tice offers its beneficiaries nothing more than a chance to compete in the
host State's labor market for the privilege of remaining [there]. 70 Weiss
argues that the foundations of the rule against domestic violence, though
progressive in character,' are market-driven, and there is no relent to
his critique on this account:
The domestic violence rule will, until national or European judi-
cial authorities or the Community legislature revise its scope,
fail the individuals it purports to help-mainly vulnerable
women from poor countries suffering abuse from European
spouses reaping the benefits of participation in the common
market. But it will also stand out as an anomaly, both in relation
to the national immigration laws of Member States that do not
66. Id. at 820. The United States is not alone in these exercises, as Shachar points out in
her consideration of the "erasing" of territory by virtue of the excision policy adopted by Aus-
tralia in its Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act of 2001. Id. at 832-34.
Indeed, these are practices "increasingly popular among well-off countries trying to take an-
ticipatory or preventive action by extending their influence far away from their own
geographical boundaries in order to curb territorial entry by irregular migrants." Id. at 822.
67. Id. at 811.
68. Adam Weiss, Transnational Families in Crisis: An Analysis of the Domestic Vio-
lence Rule in E.U. Free Movement Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 841 (2009).
69. A consolidation Directive of four decades of legislative, activity, id. at 845, and of
jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice, id. at 847. The "domestic violence rule," as
Weiss terms it, is set out in Article 13 of the Directive and is reproduced by Weiss. See id. at
847-48.
70. Id. at 876. Earlier in the essay, the "first glance". of Article 13, Weiss writes, sug-
gests a "fair compromise" for family members of nationals of the European Union. Id. at 849
("In theory, the domestic violence rule in the Free Movement Directive is a progressive meas-
ure aimed at preventing gender-based violence related to the power imbalance immigration
law creates when one family member derives residence rights through another."). Weiss con-
siders, though, that the protection is directed toward "an absurdly discrete group": "abused
third-country spouses of E.U. migrants exercising treaty rights, when those spouses are eco-
nomically active or self-sufficient and have obtained a divorce before their spouse left the
country." Id. at 853.
71. Id. at 849 (or, at 857, "particularly progressive").
72. Id. at 843 ("[T]he goals of European Community law addressing internal movement
of citizens have been primarily economic.") (emphasis in original). Consider, however, the
more detailed policy background for this rule. Id. at 861-63.
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have similar rules, and as a fundamental (or quasi-fundamental)
rights provision embedded in a legislative scheme designed to
create a common market.73
The law has once again been found wanting, and the gender inequi-
ties that it perpetrates are once again not difficult to miss.
74
In the final set of contributions to the Symposium, we turn to the
matter of universal jurisdiction which--one could say par defini-
tionem-removes territorial considerations from the equation of the
prosecution of certain crimes under public international law for "the na-
ture of the [criminal] act entitles a state to exercise its jurisdiction to
apply its laws, even if the act has occurred outside its territory, even if it
has been perpetrated by a non-national, and even if nationals have not
been harmed by the acts.' 75 Understood as such, we might reflect differ-
ently on the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as an instance of, or holding out
hopes and possibilities for, universal jurisdiction since it provides that
[p]ersons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enu-
merated in [this Convention] shall be tried by a competent
tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was commit-
ted, or by such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which have
accepted its jurisdiction.76
To be sure, there are two components to this provision-one dealing
with the jurisdiction of the State, and the other with "such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting
Parties which have accepted its jurisdiction." This latter prospect is not
tied to any territorial qualification, it must be said, but the former com-
ponent very much is and, by virtue of this difference, one might incline
toward the proposition that "the provisions of Article VI fall short of
universal jurisdiction in the sense of an entitlement of any national court
to assert competence over the offence. 77
Anthony J. Colangelo, of the Dedman School of Law, traces the
normative lineage of universal jurisdiction, as he explains how its
73. Id. at 876 (emphasis in original).
74. This discrepancy is especially stark in view of the "particularly high risk of [immi-
grant woman in] experiencing domestic abuse." Id. at 842.
75. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 57 (1994) (emphasis added).
76. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. VI,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (emphasis added).
77. See HIGGINS, supra note 75, at 62; see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 92 (3d ed. 2007).
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"uniqueness" presents "a species of false conflict for the international
legal system.""8 He argues that since "the State exercising universal ju-
risdiction merely enforces shared normative and legal commitments of
all, no conflict of laws exists since the law being applied is the same eve-
rywhere." " Those conflicts that do occur-or the "jurisdictional
ordering" of competing claims, as he puts it-are "more a question of
adjudicative, as opposed to prescriptive, jurisdiction,"80 and it is emphati-
cally universal jurisdiction as one of "the bases of prescriptive
jurisdiction" that is of concern to us here."
What is interesting to note in this synopsis is how the enforcement of
public international law is tied to a State's entitlement-or "shared enti-
tlement"-to take prosecutorial action," and to do so as a base of
"international jurisdiction,8 13 when some accommodation must surely be
made for both mandatory and permissive modes of universal jurisdiction
under public international law.4 Regardless of this bifurcation, Wolfgang
Kaleck, of the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights in
Berlin, makes an important rejoinder in his contribution when he re-
minds us of how "territory" might continue to assert its influence even in
prima facie instances of universal jurisdiction. It does (and will do) so if
the relevant national legislation presumes the presence of the accused on
the territory of the State claiming universal jurisdiction, 5 a point that is
taken up in the context of Belgium's June 1993 legislation on grave
78. Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International "False Conflict"
of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 881, 883 (2009).
79. Id. at 883 (although also exploring the possibilities for the abuse of universal juris-
diction).
80. Id. at 883.
81. Id. at 882.
82. Id. at 886; see also id. at 886 n.6, 889, 898 ("all States may prosecute the perpetra-
tors") (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 889. Universal jurisdiction "authorizes States not to enforce any distinctly
national entitlement, but to enforce a shared international entitlement to suppress universal
crimes as prescribed by international law." Id. at 889.
84. This was done in the formulation concerning grave breaches in Common Article
49/50/129/146 of the Geneva Conventions of August 1949 ("Each High Contracting Party
shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have or-
dered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their
nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provi-
sions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party
concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made our a prima facie case." Id. (em-
phasis added)). However, Colangelo later writes of a State's "shared entitlement and
commitment-with all other States-to suppress certain international crimes deemed univer-
sal." Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
85. Wolfgang Kaleck, From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe
1998-2008, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 927, 933, 958 (2009) (discussing legislation including a
"presence requirement"); see also Wolfgang Kaleck, Presentation to the 102nd Annual Meet-
ing of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 12, 2008).
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breaches of international humanitarian law (as amended in February
1999),"6 the 2001 International Criminal Court Act of the United King-
dom,87 and the German Code of Crimes against International Law of
June 2002.88
The final installment of this concluding section belongs to Anne
Orford, who directs the Institute of International Law and the Humani-
ties at the University of Melbourne. In the most wide-ranging and
thought-provoking Essay of the collection, Orford positions jurisdiction
in respect of territory and does so from a historical perspective. Central
to her contribution, however, are the other factors affecting this dy-
namic-of questions relating to authority and audience within public
international law.89 Her analysis leads her to make the distinction be-
tween jurisdiction that is claimed and that which is performed, "the
process by which a worldly claimant to authority is transformed
through the successful performance of the power to declare the law."9
It is an analysis that takes us across the challenging terrains of political
theory and the history of international institutions, as Orford adapts the
traditions of thinking on jurisdiction and territory to "the emergence
and institutionalization of the 'responsibility to protect' concept."9' Her
conclusion is that "we see a movement away from the representation of
intervention as an exceptional interference in the domestic affairs of
States, and towards the representation of international presence as au-
thorized, and indeed mandated, by international legal obligations," 92
86. See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium's War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 888 (2003). But see Luc Reydams, Belgium Reneges on Universality: The 5 August
2003 Act on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 679
(2003).
87. Kaleck, supra note 85, at 940.
88. Id. at 949 (discussing the presence of the accused Germany, or of a "legitimating
link" between the crime in question and Germany).
89. Anne Orford, Jurisdiction Without Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the
Responsibility to Protect, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 981 (2009). Orford, I think, best captures this
idea in her statement that "[t]he legitimacy of authority-whether of States or of the interna-
tional community-depends on the capacity to provide effective protection to populations at
risk." Id. at 1003. This is notwithstanding any misgivings I might have about recurrent uses of
the concept of an international community. See Dino Kritsiotis, Imagining the International
Community, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 961 (2002). Orford notes that "who this 'we' refers to"-i.e.,
in the 2005 World Summit Outcome-"is not spelled out:' even though it is pivotal to any
understanding of the "collective action" mentioned therein. Id. at 1007. Orford regards the
World Summit Outcome as envisaging two forms of authority, that of the State and "one in the
form of the international community." Id. at 1008. But see id. at 1013. For further assessments
of these and related themes, see ALFRED P. RUBIN, ETHICS AND AUTHORITY AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1997).
90. Orford, supra note 89, at 988.
91. Id. at 982.
92. Id. at 999 (what Nesiah regards as a "framework shift" from humanitarian interven-
tion in Nesiah, From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad, supra note 25, at 77).
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though the extent to which these representations reflect an earlier theme
from her discussions for this Issue-that is of "soft" as opposed to
"hard" regimes9_must for now remain an open question. It is a separate
matter, too, as to the depth of the political commitment which has ac-
companied (and which will succeed) this array of noble pronouncements
which Orford relates. 94
The thematic designation for this Symposium oddly awards "terri-
tory" pride of place in our conceptual thinking, for it suggests that we
are now encountering territory "without boundaries" as opposed to terri-
tory with boundaries, possibly symptomatic of Thomas L. Friedman's
"flat world,"'95 conceived as his eyes scoured the horizons of Bangalore-
one of the global cities of the global South.96 Or perhaps it is reminiscent
of William Gibson's "post-geographical feeling," as articulated in No
Maps for These Territories (2000).9 That said, it is evident just how
much territory continues to fashion our perceptions and our interpreta-
tions: it has consolidated its hold on our consciousness, since we take up
territorial frames of reference and modes of thinking even when we are
least aware that that is what we are in fact doing9 The Essays of the
Symposium have noted, too, the "considerable power" that territorial
considerations have had, and continue to have, in legal logic as well as
93. Orford, supra note 89, at 995. For "'soft' forms of U.N. intervention" see also id.
On the General Assembly's World Summit Outcome of Oct. 2005, see Orford, id. at 999-
1000, 1002, 1003-1009 and ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 22 (2007).
94. See BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 93, at 22.
95. Pursuant to a remark made by Nandan Nilekani, then the CEO of Infosys, see
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY (2005). For a critical perspective of this position, consider Bill McKibben, Green
Fantasia, N.Y. REV. BKS., Nov. 6, 2008, at 53, 55 ("In [HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED: WHY WE
NEED A GREEN REVOLUTION-AND HOW IT CAN RENEW AMERICA (2008)] [Friedman is] still
describing a world, completely consonant with his 'flatness' metaphor, where the number of
American airline passengers will double by 2025. But in the real world of expensive energy,
the air carriers are shedding routes and parking planes-The New Republic reported in August
on a new study that showed America might go from four hundred primary airports to as few as
fifty by 2025, and traffic might fall by 40 percent").
96. See A.R. Vasavi, Brand Bangalore: Emblem of Globalizing India, in MULTIPLE
CITY: WRITINGS ON BANGALORE 264 (Aditi De ed., 2008); see also GURCHARAN DAS, INDIA
UNBOUND: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVOLUTION FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION AGE 251-53 (2000).
97. See No MAPS FOR THESE TERRITORIES (Chris Paine/907 Productions 2000); see also
No Maps for These Territories, http://www.nomaps.com (last visited May Ii, 2009).
98. See Elkins, supra note 7, at 18; see also SARAH RADCLIFFE & SALLIE WESTWOOD,
REMAKING THE NATION: PLACE, IDENTITY AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 56 (1996).
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legal imagination," though we can appreciate how important, as a practi-
cal matter, territory might be to the survival and the sustainability of a
State.'m Territory and the concept of territory indeed remain fundamental
to the organization of the State and, thus, to the very being of public in-
ternational law:
The reason for the rule that one of the necessary attributes of a
State is that it shall possess territory is that one cannot contem-
plate a State as a kind of disembodied spirit. Historically, the
concept is one of insistence that there must be some portion of
the earth's surface which its people inhabit and over which its
government exercises authority. '°'
Yet, many of the essays in this collection will force us to think out-
side of the territorial box as it were, not of "territory without
boundaries," but rather, as Vasuki Nesiah has put it, of "territories where
the boundaries are porous and shifting between scale and between dif-
ferent networks. ' '2 The focus, then, is on the persistence but also on the
changing characteristics of these boundaries and of their relation to "the
territorial [S]tate"' 3-and, we could add, to various orthodoxies of pub-
lic international law. We have observed this phenomenon in action most
especially in the contributions of Saskia Sassen, Ayelet Shachar, and
Anne Orford, and, from these and from other accounts, it would appear
that for public international law to deliver on the goods that are part of
its perennial promise-peace, justice, human rights, and environmental
security, amongst other things-it will remain in constant need of crea-
tive and critical modes of thinking. This suggests a delicate balance
between an appreciation of how territory and territorial thinking can and
should inform new legal regimes, methods, structures, and solutions, and
99. HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 128 (2000). This is pedaled at times through "powerful fantasy," as argued by
Anne Orford, A Jurisprudence of the Limit, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 1, 8
(Anne Orford ed., 2006).
100. This is, for example, evident from the plan of President Mohamed Nasheed of the
Maldives to purchase land elsewhere as "an insurance policy for the worst possible outcome"
from the effects of climate change. See Randeep Ramesh, Paradise Almost Lost: Maldives
Seek to Buy A New Homeland, GUARDIAN, Nov. 10, 2008, at 1.
101. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Philip C. Jessup, Remarks at U.N. SCOR,
383d mtg. at 11, Supp. No. 128, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 383 (Dec. 2, 1948); see also Michelle Bur-
gis, Faith in the State? Traditions of Territoriality, International Law and the Emergence of
Modern Arab Statehood, 9 J. HIsT. INT'L L. 37 (2009).
102. Nesiah, Slumdog Million Reforms, supra note 25, at 3, 14 (urging that "[o]ur con-
ceptual architecture and reform proposals need to scale up to the complexity of global
technologies of urban governance"); see also BRUCE MAU ET AL., MASSIVE CHANGE (2004).
103. Oxman, supra note 7, at 830 ("[A]ll in time came to be subordinated in the interna-
tional legal order to the insistent quest for supremacy of the territorial [S]tate.").
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an acknowledgement of the limitations that such approaches bring-
together with an assessment of the preferred alternatives for action.'"
104. See supra notes 18-21 and 75 (and accompanying text).
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